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                   Abstract 
Current norms for the protection of internally displaced persons is richly 
influenced by principles entrenched in international humanitarian law as 
applicable to civilians and non-combatants who are not actively involved in 
the prosecution of wars. These principles though not specifically directed at 
this category of persons per se is no doubt of paramount importance to them 
being victims of armed violence occurring within the borders of their own 
country. This paper keenly examines legal implications of international 
humanitarian law rule applicable to non-international armed conflicts to 
situations of internal displacement with the view to identifying the extent to 
which the rules and principles can be applied to fan protection for internally 
displaced persons beyond the parameters set out in the standard setting norms 
on internal displacement. This conceptual discourse is significant as it 
contributes to the need to engage in more insightful thoughts on alternate 
ways of strengthening protection and assistance of internally displaced 
persons. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The complementary role of international humanitarian law in setting normative standards for the 
protection of internally displaced persons is indubitable as current norms on internal displacement are 
clear restatement of principles of humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law by analogy 
(Guistiniani, 2011). This advancement is evidently captured in the Guiding Principles (GP, 2009) and 
later replicated in the Great Lakes Pact (ICGLR, 2006) and the African Union Convention for the 
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (Kampala Convention, 2009).  
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) simply refers to rule and principles of international law applicable 
to war generally. They are also called “law of wars (LOW) or “law of armed conflicts (Solis: 2010). 
This rule governs armed conflict involving states, civil war groups or secessionists as well as those 
engaged in any form of state or non-state belligerency (Nagib, 2009). In traditional parlance they are 
collectively referred to “jus in bello” which literally connotes “set of rules of international law relating 
to the conditions under which a subject of international law is permitted to resort to armed force” 
(Bugnion, 2003) or law of armed conflicts” (Policastri & Stone)  as opposed to “jus ad bellum” which 
on the other hand means “set of rules of international law applicable to the mutual relations of parties 
to an international armed conflict or the law and customs of war” (Bugnion, 2003; Stahn, 2007).  
Broadly speaking, the application of law of armed conflicts or IHL is limited in two category of armed 
conflicts, namely international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict, with each having 
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distinct rules. It is worthy of note that the extent to which the autonomy grounded in this distinction in 
terms of legal and practical implications is still shrouded in raging controversies especially having 
regard to the right of states to quell insurrection and rebellion, and the right of the people to self-
determination as derived from the supranational prescriptions in the United Nations Charter (Arts. 1(2) 
& 55, 1945). Some commentators have described the distinction as arbitrary, unjustifiable and devoid 
of the humanitarian stance which this branch of international law represents (Warwick & Rowe, 1996).  
 
The protection of internally displaced persons in this paper is examined from the general perspectives 
of protection of civilian populations in situation of armed conflicts that takes place   within the territory 
of individual states as opposed to extra-territorial (Hickel, 2001).  Bearing this in mind, this article 
critically assesses the role of international humanitarian law in the protection and assistance of internally 
displaced persons within the context of non-international armed conflicts with a view to identifying 
interpretative legal issues limiting their wholesale application to situation of internal displacement. 
 
2. SOURCES AND PROGRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
The sources of international law as set out in the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is 
universally authoritative (Art. 38). It suffices also for international humanitarian law being a subset of 
the former. These are international treaties/conventions which are formal agreements between states or 
between states and international organizations or between intergovernmental organizations (Vienna 
Convention, 1969: Art. 2) ; customary international law which consists of unwritten rules created by 
the practices of States;  general principles as recognized by civilized nations popularly referred to as 
peremptory norms or jus cogens; and judicial decisions of courts such as the International Court of 
Justice and International Criminal Court and the most highly qualified juristic writings as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law. 
 
It is apt to state that since 1864 when Dunant called for an international regulation of casualties of 
battlefields which culminated in the emergence of the first Geneva Convention (American Red Cross, 
2011) comprising of only ten articles, international humanitarian law has been in gradual progression 
(St Petersburg Declaration, 1868). 
 
Two legal current have contributed to further development of international humanitarian law, these are 
Hague Law which consists of the 1899 and 1907 Conventions and the Geneva Law comprising pre 
1949 and 1949 Conventions now merged together by virtue of the two Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Convention in 1977. Today as far as issue of humanitarian law treaties are concerned, reference 
is currently limited to the four Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocol on one hand and 
other Conventions dealing with specific subjects of international humanitarian law such as 1980 
Convention on the Use of Conventional Weapons, Convention on Chemical Weapons 1993, Protocol 
relating to Blinding Laser Weapons 1995, 1996 Revision of the 1980 Convention, Convention on Anti-
Personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty 1997, 1998 Rome of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Protocol II to the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 1999, 2000 Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, 
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention) 2003,  2005 Protocol III 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, relating to the adoption of an additional distinctive emblem (the “Red 
Crystal”),  and Convention on Cluster Munitions 2008 on the other hand (Bonvier & Langholtz, 2012). 
 
As far this article is concerned, discussion would be limited to the Geneva Conventions (I-IV) of 1949 
and the Additional Protocols (I&II) of 1977 because of their distinctiveness and universal acceptance 
(Wikipedia, 2016). 
 
3. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
IHL rules are invoked only in situations of an ‘armed conflict.’ Armed conflict is not authoritatively 
defined in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols despite several references made to the 
term in international humanitarian law.  However, following the decision of International Criminal 
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Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor v. Tadic, in which the accused, a Bosnian Serb 
politician and former member of a paramilitary armed forces supporting the attacks on Serb-run 
concentration camps in Prijedor was alleged of commission of crimes against humanity and grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, the tribunal held in  determining the application of the Geneva 
Conventions while rejecting the defence argument that there were no hostilities at the relevant time and 
place that: 
…An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups…International humanitarian law applies from the 
initiation of such conflicts… (ICTY, 1996:70). 
 
It is important to note that before a decision is made on which of the IHL rules that is applicable in any 
given instance, the nature of armed conflict must be first and foremost determined. Basically, flowing 
from the combined provisions of the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I and II, two 
kind of armed conflicts suffice for the application of international humanitarian law namely; 
international armed conflicts (IAC) and non-international armed conflicts (NIAC). In other words, rules 
of IHL apply differently depending on whether the armed conflict in question is international or non-
international. 
 
International armed conflicts (IAC) is defined in the common article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions 
as: 
… All cases of declared war or of any other conflict which may arise between 
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of 
partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even 
if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. 
 
It therefore follows that for an armed conflict to qualify as international armed conflict, ‘parties to the 
conflict’ must be a state within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, 
thus acknowledgment of the existence or non-existence of state of war between them is immaterial. 
State within the purview of the Geneva Conventions is a High Contracting Party who have signed and 
or ratified the said treaty provisions. It is however submitted that the existence of international armed 
conflicts should be decided on case by case basis (Jones & Powles, 2003). 
 
In all armed conflicts bearing on above description, all the provisions of the four Geneva Conventions 
apply in addition to Additional Protocol I for states that have ratified it by virtue of article 1(3) thereof.  
It is glaring to add here that Additional Protocol I has expanded the definition of international armed 
conflict (IAC) to also include “armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination 
and alien domination and racist regimes” in accordance with article 1(4) of Additional Protocol II to 
bring them within the protection engendered by the spirit and purport of common article 2 of the Geneva 
Conventions. This Protocol abandons the concept of protected persons used in article 4 of the fourth 
Geneva Convention as it opted for an inclusive notion of civilians who are not combatants. It therefore 
follows that all the provisions of this Protocol aimed at protecting civilians are also applicable to IDPs 
especially under part IV of the Protocol, for instance under article 50 of Additional Protocol I. 
 
On the other hand, non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) is described by common article 3 of the 
four Geneva Conventions as “… armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” Therefore its application is limited to armed conflicts 
which involves only armed forces of a state armed force of government opponent (belligerents) who 
are not combatants of another state’s armed force occurring within the territory of High Contracting 
Parties (Solis,  2010).  Article 1(2) of the Additional Protocol II clearly excludes internal disturbances 
such as riot, disorder and banditry from notion of non-international armed conflict and consequently 




The scope of application of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is strictly limited to a lower 
threshold of armed conflict. In other words, to determine whether a particular armed conflict is a non-
international armed conflict or mere internal disturbance/violence two conditions relating to the nature 
of the conflict must be fully examined to wit: the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the 
parties to the conflict (ICTY, 1997:352).  In other words, where the armed attacks are not ‘sufficiently 
violent and protracted’ and the non-state armed groups are not ‘sufficiently organized’ it is likely to be 
regarded as internal disturbance which constitute criminal acts punishable in domestic courts and in 
which case IHL rules of protection as envisaged in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II 
in respect of non-international armed conflict would be inapplicable. 
 
It is important to note also that in non- international armed conflicts, common article 3 applies and 
perhaps Additional Protocol II apply and thus no other portion of the Geneva Conventions is applicable. 
Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is the sole article that deals with several kinds of internal 
armed conflicts in one single breadth namely- civil wars, insurrections and armed uprisings.  
 
Common article 3 have attained customary international status as it guarantees humane treatment and 
applies to entire civilian population which also include IDPs (Pictet, 1952-9). It is therefore based on 
this reason inter-alia that it is often referred to as “Geneva Convention in miniature” (ICTR, 2001); 
Pictet, 1952-9). However to the extent that common article 3 establishes minimum yardstick of the rules 
of international humanitarian law applicable to internal and international and armed conflicts (ICJ, 
1986), it is safe to submit that it applies across the range of armed conflict notwithstanding their 
characterization.  
 
It is important to add that by reason of the changing nature in the methods of warfare,  an internal armed 
conflict could turn out to an international armed conflict if armed troops intervene ‘significantly and 
continuously’ thereby making the provisions of Geneva Conventions regarding international armed 
conflict to apply to conflicts of non-international character (ICTY, 2006). 
 
4.  PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN INTERNATIONAL  
     HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
Owing to the growing number of internal strife, generalized violence and gross human rights violations 
occurring within the borders of various states around the globe, multitude of people have been forced 
to leave their place of residence to elsewhere in search of safety and other livelihoods. This vulnerable 
persons are called internally displaced persons for reasons that their persecution has not taken them 
outside the territory of their own state. Internally displaced persons is authoritatively defined by the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1998 following the appointment of the then Representative 
of the UN Secretary General (Francis Mading Deng) by the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights. The Principles defines ‘internally displaced persons’ as: 
Persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid 
the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence violations of 
human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed 
an internationally recognized State border. (GP, 1998: Para 2 & Kampala 
Convention, 2009:Art. 1k). 
 
The above definition which is merely guiding and descriptive but not binding, incorporates two distinct 
legal criteria to wit; First, the involuntary nature of their flight and second, the fact that they have not 
crossed into the territory of another state. Though uprooted by similar causes akin to refugees, it is the 
internal/external dichotomy that is rightly used in distinguishing refugees from internally displaced 
persons who as a matter of law must be resident outside the shores of their own country at the material 
time when protection and assistance is sought (UN Refugee Convention, 1951: Art. 1 (2) A).  
 
However, the extent of deprivations suffered by internally displaced persons is further heightened by 
the fact that in addition to absence of binding international legal protection, they are not like refugees 
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who are under the direct responsibility of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR Statute, 1950, Para 8). Consequently, it becomes obligatory to fan for more concrete scheme 
of protection for this category of persons whose description failed to confer on them any special status 
in international law (Ladan, 2015).  
 
Surprisingly internally displaced person (IDP) is not defined in international humanitarian law.  
However, civilians and non-combatants are clearly described therein as: 
…Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause (GC I-IV, 1949:Art.3). 
 
The purpose of the definition of civilians in the foregoing provision is meant to generate an extensive 
meaning that would increase to the maximum extent, the breadth of humanitarian protection granted by 
the law on armed conflicts (Kolb & Hyde, 2008). Juxtaposing the position of IDPs especially in 
displacement caused by armed conflicts occurring within the territory of High Contracting Parties which 
are so described as “conflict of non-international character,’ for instance in Nigeria’s North East region 
where government’s armed forces are fighting the Boko Haram insurgency in order to suppress  and if 
possible annihilate them (Akinbi, 2015), with the above statutory description, IDPs to the extent that 
they are not involved in hostilities would rightly qualify as civilians or non-combatants within the 
meaning of Common article 3 of the four Geneva conventions and article 4 of Additional Protocol II 
provided the determining criteria of level of intensity of attack and the organization of the non-state 
armed force (Boko Haram insurgents) suggests the existence of an internal armed conflict and not mere 
internal disturbances, such as violence, tensions and banditry (Cassese, 2004). 
 
Aside from the foregoing, rules of international humanitarian law may also be applicable to situations 
of displacement caused by internal disturbances which are clearly outside its province where parties to 
the conflict agree to apply the same to conflicts beyond and above the formal prescription in accordance 
with articles 6, 6, 6 and 7 of the first, second, third and fourth of Geneva Conventions respectively. 
 
 
4.  RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABL 
TO SITUATIONS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 
 
In the quest for sufficient if not adequate protection for victims of internal disturbances/violence below 
the threshold of armed conflicts under the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocol II and who 
are technically called ‘internally displaced persons’ as adumbrated above, states bears national 
responsibility for their protection and assistance for reasons that they are in the same pedestal with other 
citizens (Kampala Convention, 2009: Art. 5).  This becomes more meaningful when existing norms for 
the protection for this vulnerable persons are domesticated into national laws and policies taking cue 
from the principles richly entrenched in international humanitarian law (Kampala Convention,  2009: 
Art. 7).  It is gladdening to note that some of the principles encapsulated in international humanitarian 
law, which by way of analogy is applicable to internally displaced persons have acquired universal 
acceptance justifying their replications in the existing norms on internal displacement. 
 
The prevention and prohibition of violations of these extant principles of international humanitarian 
law would indeed lead to gradual reduction of the depravities associated with situations of internal 
displacement as a result of violence that takes place within the borders of state in view of the fact that 
the triggering causes are potentially the same (ICRC, 2010), notwithstanding the characterization of the 
conflict in question. Thus this section of the paper will in no particular order examine rules and 
principles as expressed in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, and where necessary 
cross reference shall be made to both the Guiding Principles and the Africa Union IDP treaty to show 
extent of their restatements. 
 
In another aspect, rules of international humanitarian law is of immense significance to the realization 
of protection needs of internally displaced persons insofar as the prevention and protection against 
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unlawful and arbitrary displacements is concerned. Arbitrary displacement is a concept that is aptly 
employed in a number of norms relevant to internally displaced persons than in any other area of legal 
discourse, because of its potential as a catch-all-phrase for unlawful treatments which are considered 
not only to be disparaging but inhumane such as unlawful detention, forceful transfer and 
disappearance, killings-widespread or systematic, displacement by whatever cause etc. Even though 
individual branches of international law developed on separate paths, forced displacement in which the 
notion of arbitrariness resonates has become their common site of convergence (Fitzpatrick, 2000).  
 
The protection of IDPs in non-international armed conflicts occurring within the territory of High 
Contracting Party against forced displacement in the form of deportation, mass transfers and evacuation 
is well provided for in article 49 of the fourth Geneva Convention. Civilians in similar circumstances 
are also protected against forceful displacement or object of attacks under articles 4(3) (e) and 17 (1) 
and (2) and 13 of Additional Protocol II respectively as replicated in article 7 (3) of the Kampala 
Convention. 
 
International humanitarian law is greatly underpinned by the philosophical idea that notwithstanding 
the characterization of conflict, ultimate consideration shall be accorded to the need to protect civilians 
and non-combatants who are not involved in hostilities based on customary international law which is 
unequivocally influenced by the principles of humanity and obedience to public conscience derived 
from unwritten rules inherent in existing treaty law such as Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols I and II.   What is more, the preamble to Protocol I asserts to the effect that the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 ‘are to be fully applied in all circumstances… without any adverse distinction 
based on the nature of origin of the armed conflict or on the cause s espouse by or attributed to the 
Parties to the conflict’ (Green, 2000). In the erstwhile 1899 Hague Conventions II and 1907 Hague 
Convention IV, this minimum humanitarian guarantee is called the “Martens Clause.”   
 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in  Legality of Nuclear Weapons Case (ICJ, 1996;226) which 
touches on the legality of threat and use of nuclear weapons reaffirmed the principles of civilian 
protection  “as one of the cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabrics of 
international law”(Hayashi, 2007).  
 
It is therefore apt to note that based on the notion of civilian protection as evidenced from the provisions 
of Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocols I and II,  Customary International Humanitarian Law 
rules, internally displaced persons as a result of armed conflict occurring within the territory of a High 
Contracting State qualify as civilian in this context necessitating their guaranteed right to safe return 
upon the cessation of hostilities in accordance with articles 49 and 147 of the fourth Geneva Convention, 
articles 51(7), 78(1) and 84(5) (a) of Additional Protocol, articles 4(3) (e) and 17 & of Additional 
Protocol II and Rules 129 and 132 of CIHL which are  all of utmost relevance in this regard. The obvious 
problem with international humanitarian law’s notion of guarantees against displacement is the fact that 
it focuses more on involuntary relocation rather than dealing in comprehensive term with situations of 
forced displacement during armed conflicts (Phoung, 2004). 
 
The foregoing scheme of protection against arbitrary displacement is well restated in Principles 6(1) of 
the Guiding Principles to the effect that every human being enjoys an inherent right to be protected 
against arbitrary displacement from his habitual place of residence. The principles extends the meaning 
of arbitrary displacement to also include engaging in large scale development projects among other acts 
listed under paragraph 2 thereof which endanger human lives during displacement. In similar vein, 
Kampala Convention also frowns at displacement predicated on arbitrary and unlawful grounds.  
The Convention under the heading coined ‘prohibition and prevention of arbitrary displacement’ is in 
itself a significant innovation as article 4 thereof recognizes the right not to be arbitrarily displaced in a 
language that is more explicit and elaborative than in any other existing norms regarding internal 
displacement (Abebe, 2010; Alemayehu, 2010). For instance article 4 (4) (a – h) of this Convention 
have no equivalence in any other binding norms on internal displacement.  In particular, the Convention 
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provides against arbitrary displacement of people whose existence is dependent on land and declare that 
engaging in such prohibited acts of arbitrary displacement could amount to commission of international 
crimes ( Kampala Convention: 2009, Arts. 4 & 6).  The Convention like the Guiding Principles provides 
that development projects could lead to arbitrary displacement under article 10 thereof. 
It should be added that unlike Principle 9 (c) of the Guiding Principles, the Kampala Convention miss 
the mark in not providing for kind and purpose of projects envisaged under the Convention. The word 
“project” in the opinion of this researcher is too wide and thus amenable to multiple deceitful 
interpretations by those charged with such responsibilities. In the same vein,  on question of necessity 
of the projects in the first place,  the Convention similarly failed to employ the phrase  ‘…compelling  
and overriding public interests’ used in the Guiding Principles to curb excesses of state actors and non-
state actors.  Under articles 2(4) and 3(1) of Great Lakes IDPs Protocol “member states are enjoined to 
prevent arbitrary displacement and to eliminate all root causes of displacement”.  
 
Discrimination is one of the intense triggers of internal armed conflicts which could lead to massive 
displacement of people from one part of the country to the other when coupled with egregious violations 
of human rights.  At the core of humanitarian law protection is the underpinning idea to treat all persons 
humanely and the right not to be discriminated against by whatever criteria. This entails the prevention 
and protection from forcible and involuntary displacement which is highly problematic in situations of 
internal displacement. In the course of precarious and complex situations, internally displaced persons 
have been thrown into, they are obligated not to be discriminated against because of their peculiar 
susceptibilities. The foregoing is richly underpinned also in the provisions of articles 3 and 27, articles 
75 of Additional Protocol I, and articles 2(1) and 4(1) of Additional Protocol II, and Rules 1 and 7 of 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules (GP, 1998: Principle 4). 
 
In addition to the foregoing, the general notion of civilian protection and assistance as provided for in 
the fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocols is more apt to IDPs as a result of internal armed 
conflicts ( Kampala Convention, 2009: Art. 7).  In particular, IHL rules protects property and possession 
of civilians during hostilities against direct or indiscriminate attacks or pillage (GC IV, 1949: Art. 33) 
or from being used as a shield or destruction as a form as of reprisal attack or collective punishment 
(AP I, 1977: Arts. 51 &52).  However, the protection envisaged here is in favour of those civilians who 
falls into the hands of another state and who are defined as ‘protected persons (GC IV, 1949:Art. 4 & 
Phoung, 2004:46). This is problematic because IDPs as a result of their plight lives within the borders 
of their own state and are not in the hands of the enemy state as it were and are not to be regarded as 
nationals of another state. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The continuing rise in internal displacement due to armed conflicts and violence within the territory of 
states in most part of the world (IDMC/NRC- GRID: 2016) has made the significance of distinction 
between non-international armed conflicts and internal disturbances or tensions very doubtful as far as 
application of rules of international humanitarian law as evidenced in the Geneva Conventions and 
particularly in the Additional Protocol II insofar as it occurs within the territory of a high contracting 
party is concerned.  
 
Granted that the exclusion of internal disturbances (riots, tensions and banditry) from the application of 
law of armed conflicts is anchored on the need to protect the integrity and sovereignty of states against 
interference in its domestic affairs, situation of internal displacement which is characterized as falling 
below the threshold of a recognizable armed conflict in international humanitarian law also constitutes 
threat to international and, regional peace and order. That the law of armed conflicts is state centric in 
view of its unhidden flair for upholding principles of sovereignty and equality of states deserve no 
further elaboration.   
 
However, there are special procedures under the United Nations Charter dealing with the right of 
Security Council to intervene under Chapter VII as well as under the African Union’s permissive or 
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consensual right of intervention to deal with egregious violations of this nature which are admittedly 
domestic challenges (AU Constitutive Act, 2000: Art.4h) for reasons that such intervention or 
interference finds expression in the contemporary understanding that sovereignty also entails protection 
of subjects (Kuwali, 2010). The exercise of these collective measures in themselves could achieve two 
ends namely preventing widespread displacement in addition to safeguarding the sovereign integrity of 
states concerned. 
 
It is no longer surprising to note that cases of disregard for common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
which governs non-international armed conflicts clearly outnumber instances of compliance as majority 
of states enmeshed in internal armed conflicts are not inclined to acknowledge the existence of common 
article 3 conflicts in their territory even though such recognition does not affect the legal status of the 
parties to the conflict as espoused in the final clause of Common Article 3 and also UK Ministry of 
Defence Manual  They would gladly treat such internal violence as a form of rebellion to be dealt with 
in accordance with domestic penal sanctions. What is more annoying is the fact that High Contracting 
Parties are blindly vested the ultimate power to decide on when common article 3 conflict exists as well  
article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II.  It is humbly submitted that the self-solicited function or better 
put, subjective determination of a vital decision of this nature on parties to the conflict is an over-bloated 
luxury that limits the relevance of IHL rules to internal disturbances or to put more simply violence that 
takes place within the territory of a High Contracting Party given the absence of mechanisms for 
international monitoring of states practices in this regard (Cassese, 2004: 33-4). 
 
Strict adherence to the legal complications brought about article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II which 
introduced formalistic conditions such as intensity of the conflict, effective control of part of a national 
territory and an organized structure of the parties to the conflict (ICTR, 1998) would definitely renege 
on the purpose of the law in that it would heighten the threshold far beyond the parameters of internal 
armed conflict, not to mention of extending the same to internal disturbances which are clearly 
excluded. The negative delineation of non-international armed conflicts in Additional Protocol II 
without a corresponding definition of what amounts to internal disturbances and tensions leave much 
to be desired as its material scope of operation is bedevilled with lack of precision and in most cases 
the failure provides the cheapest line of defence for unwilling states against the application of 
international humanitarian law to conflict of low intensity due to attacks from non-state armed groups 
that are not structurally organized even when it is glaring that such  armed conflicts could present urgent 
needs for humanitarian intervention.  
 
To this end, this paper concludes that all laws are created for the benefit of all human beings (ICTY, 
1995: Para. 97) hence what is evil in international context should be dealt with the same blow at the 
domestic level. The nature of the parties to the conflict and character of conflict in question is of less 
practical significance. The interpretation of the threshold of international humanitarian law in the 
context of non-international armed conflict  as applicable to civilian protection should be guided by the 
understanding of the purpose and object of international humanitarian law which is the provision of 
highest protection to victims of armed conflicts occurring within the territory of a High Contracting 
Party in particular (Vienna Convention, 1969: Art. 33)  Where internal displacement is as a result of 
armed conflict, international humanitarian law based on its raison de’etre (reasons for its adoption) in 
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